

# Metric Uncapacitated Facility Location

$I$ : set of facilities

$J$ : set of clients

$f_i$ : opening cost of facility  $i$

$d_{ij}$ : cost of assigning client  $j$  to facility  $i$

Goal: Open a subset of facilities and assign each client to an open facility while incurring in a minimum cost

## Primal-Dual Approximation Algorithm (Jain & Vazirani, 2001)

$$(LP): \min \sum_{i \in I} f_i y_i + \sum_{i \in I} \sum_{j \in J} d_{ij} x_{ij}$$
$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{i \in I} x_{ij} \geq 1 \quad \forall j \in J \rightarrow \alpha_j$$
$$x_{ij} \leq y_i \quad \forall i \in I, j \in J \rightarrow \beta_{ij}$$
$$x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in I, j \in J$$

$$(D): \max \sum_{j \in J} \alpha_j$$
$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{j \in J} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \quad \forall i \in I \rightarrow y_i$$
$$\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad \forall i \in I, j \in J \rightarrow x_{ij}$$
$$\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in I, j \in J$$

Interpretation of dual:  
•  $\alpha_j$ : Total cost paid by  $j$  to get assigned to an open facility.  
•  $\beta_{ij}$ : Cost paid by  $j$  to open facility  $i$ .

Why? Suppose  $(x, y)$  is integral and optimal for (LP). Let  $(\alpha, \beta)$  be a corresponding dual solution.

By complementary slackness:

- $y_i > 0 \Rightarrow \sum_{j \in J} \beta_{ij} = f_i$  (To open  $i$ ,  $f_i$  needs to be paid by all clients)
- $x_{ij} > 0 \Rightarrow \alpha_j = d_{ij} + \beta_{ij}$  (If  $j$  is connected to  $i$ ,  $j$  pays the assignment cost and its share for opening  $i$ )
- $\alpha_j > 0 \Rightarrow \sum_{i \in I} x_{ij} = 1$  (Not interesting)
- $\beta_{ij} > 0 \Rightarrow x_{ij} = y_i$  (Client  $j$  only pays its share of  $f_i$  if it uses facility  $i$ )

### Algorithm: Phase 1

•  $x, y, \alpha, \beta := 0$ ,  $T := \{i \in I \mid \sum_{j \in J} \beta_{ij} = f_i\}$  (temporarily open facilities)

#### Definitions:

- $j$  neighbors  $i$   
if  $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij}$
- $j$  contributes to  $i$  if  $\beta_{ij} > 0$

• while  $\exists$  a client  $j$  not neighboring any facility in  $T$ .

Raise  $\alpha_j$  uniformly for all such  $j$ .

- if  $j$  becomes neighbor of some  $i \in T \Rightarrow$  Increase  $\beta_{ij}$  at the same rate to maintain feasibility.


- if  $j$  becomes neighbor of some  $i \in T \Rightarrow$  Freeze variable  $\alpha_j$ .

### Phase 2 (Cleanup)

• while  $\exists$  a client contributing to at least two facilities in  $T$ :

- Pick an arbitrary such  $i$

-  $T := T - \{h \in T \mid \exists j \in J \text{ s.t. } \beta_{ij} > 0 \text{ and } \beta_{hj} > 0\}$



### Phase 3

• Set  $y_i = 1 \quad \forall i \in T$

For all  $j \in J$ :

- Case 1:  $j$  contributes to a unique  $i \in T \Rightarrow x_{ij} = 1$

- Case 2:  $j$  contributes to no  $i \in T$  but neighbors some  $i \in T$

$\Rightarrow x_{ij} := 1$  for arbitrary such  $i$ .

- Case 3:  $j$  has no neighbors in  $T \Rightarrow$  Let  $i$  be closest facility in  $T$ ,  $x_{ij} = 1$ .

### Analysis:

Lemma: If at the end of Phase 2 there is a client  $j$  with no neighbors in  $T$ , there exists  $i \in T$  s.t.  $d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j$ .

Proof: Later

Theorem: The algorithm gives a 3-approximation.

Proof: For every  $i$ , let  $A(i) = \{\text{neighbours of } i \text{ s.t. } x_{ij} = 1\}$

$$\sum_{i \in T} (f_i + \sum_{j \in A(i)} d_{ij}) = \sum_{i \in T} \sum_{j \in A(i)} (\beta_{ij} + d_{ij}) = \sum_{i \in T} \sum_{j \in A(i)} \alpha_j$$


Let  $Z := J \setminus \bigcup_{i \in T} A(i)$  (clients with no neighbors in  $T$ )

$$\sum_{i \in T} \sum_{j \in Z} d_{ij} x_{ij} = \sum_{j \in Z} \sum_{i \in T} d_{ij} x_{ij} \stackrel{\text{Lemma}}{\leq} \sum_{j \in Z} 3\alpha_j.$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{i \in T} (f_i + \sum_{j \in J} d_{ij} x_{ij}) = \sum_{i \in T} \sum_{j \in A(i)} \alpha_j + \sum_{j \in Z} 3\alpha_j \leq 3 \sum_{j \in J} \alpha_j \leq 3 \text{OPT}_D \leq 3 \text{OPT}_{LP} \quad \square$$

Proof of Lemma:

Claim 1: Given such  $j$ , there exists  $h, k$ , s.t.:



Why?  
 • We stopped increasing  $\alpha_j$  when  $j$  neighbored some  $h \in T$ .  
 •  $h$  was removed from  $T$  in Phase 2 because  $k$  was contributing both to it and to  $i$  (which remains in  $T$ ).

Claim 2:  $d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j$

Pf: By triangle inequality.

- $d_{hj} \leq \alpha_j$  because  $h$  and  $j$  are neighbours.
- $k$  contributes to  $h \Rightarrow \beta_{hk} > 0 \Rightarrow \alpha_k > d_{hk}$ .  
 When  $\alpha_j$  stops growing,  $h$  is in  $T$ .  $k$  contributed to  $h \Rightarrow$  At that time,  $k$  already neighbors  $h$   
 $\Rightarrow \alpha_k$  doesn't stop growing after  $\alpha_j$  stops  $\Rightarrow \alpha_j \geq \alpha_k \Rightarrow \alpha_j \geq d_{hk}$ .
- $\beta_{ik} > 0 \Rightarrow \alpha_k \geq d_{ik} \Rightarrow \alpha_j \geq d_{ik}$ .

So,  $d_{ij} \leq d_{hj} + d_{hk} + d_{ik} \leq 3\alpha_j \quad \square$

Best approximation known: 1.52-approx. by Mahdian, Ye, Zhang.

Hardness: No approximation better than 1.46 possible (unless  $P=NP$ )

References: • Jain, Vazirani: Approx. algorithms for metric facility location and  $k$ -median problems (2001)

- Shmoys, Williamson: The Design of Approximation Algorithms (2010)
- Vazirani: Approximation Algorithms (2001)